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Abstract 
 
In general, the dividend payout pattern for Russian corporations during their formative 
period from 1998 to 2006 was seemingly independent of company earnings, size, 
growth opportunities and capital structure, as such firm policies appear not to conform 
to any of the main extant dividend payout theories. The only exception we find is that 
of utility firms, which were inclined to pay consistent dividends. Utility firms tended to 
be partly owned by the state and were subject to price regulation. Consequently, they 
may have had limited investment prospects. Our findings suggest that dividend payout 
policies in non-market economies may be driven by non-traditional determinants, such 
as the state’s overall industrial strategy.   
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1. Introduction 
This paper examines the dividend policies of Russian corporations during their 
formative years. We find no consistent pattern of dividend payouts, which generally 
tended to be made at irregular intervals. These results are also consistent with that of 
previous authors. For example, Zaltsman (2011) shows that from 1999 to 2009 Russian 
corporate dividend payouts were unstable. In addition, Al-Najjar (2013) finds that over 
the period from 2002 to 2008, Russian firms, on average, had the lowest dividend 
payout ratio among the sample of firms drawn from all BRIC economies. Finally, 
Kosmarskaya (2002) finds that Russian firms spanning an earlier 1998-2002 period, 
typically issued no or a negligible number of dividends. Her findings were confirmed 
in a later survey carried out by the Russian Institute of Directors (Grosman, 2012).  
Our study on the Russian corporate dividend policy adds to the above studies in a 
number of ways. First, it offers a significantly larger sample size, which also spans all 
the major industrial sectors. Second, we find that Russian firms’ dividend payout 
policies do not conform to any of the prevailing dividend literature theories, and tend 
to be independent of all main extant dividend determinants, such as company earnings, 
size, growth prospects and capital structure. Finally, our results indicate that only utility 
firms, which parent company was a state-operated monopoly during the Soviet era, paid 
consistent dividends over the 1998-2006 period. We argue that one possible reason for 
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this is that the utility sector is associated with extremely unattractive investment 
opportunities and dividend policy is used to attract shareholders.  
At first, the above evidence on the reluctance of Russian corporations to pay 
dividends might appear surprising. This is especially so since Russia has a long tradition 
of weak property rights, including weak legal protections for company shareholders. In 
fact, many shareholders in the aftermath of the 1998 financial crisis were left holding 
worthless shares in many bankrupt companies. In addition, as we describe further below, 
the form of the Russian corporation under study here was of recent origin, emerging in 
the first few years of the first Putin regime. Consequently, there is every reason to 
expect investors to prefer to receive investment returns in the form of dividend payouts 
rather than through longer-term capital gains (La Porta et al., 2000). 
Indeed, many of the firms included in our study were former state enterprises, 
which only a short time before were converted to a corporate form. With incorporation, 
came the requirement to publicly list financial information. Our data is drawn from the 
Russian Trading Systems (RTS) stock exchange, which was one of the country’s 
leading stock exchanges. Though the RTS was established in 1995, meaningful 
company data was unavailable until 1998, in which year the RTS index offered 
information on approximately 150 company listings. However, the index included 50 
of the most liquid and capitalized firms, collectively accounting for 85 percent of the 
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total market capitalization (Vanteeva and Hickson, 2015). By 2007 the number of firms 
trading on the RTS grew rapidly to just over 400, while the index itself increased from 
300 in 2000 to 2,360 by 2007 (Lazareva et al., 2007). We chose to end our sample 
period at the end of 2006, which is just prior to the onset of the 2007-08 world financial 
crisis.  
The growth in corporations described above, as reflected in the RTS index, is 
generally associated with a fortuitous improvement starting in the early 2000s in 
Russia’s terms of trade due to higher oil prices. Enhanced export earnings enabled the 
government to promote other industrial sectors through subsidized credit interest rates 
and credit guarantees (Vedev, 2008). Correspondingly, during this period, Russia’s 
capital market grew steadily, with private investment increasing from $11 billion in 
2000 to $54 billion in 2005 (Treisman, 2007). Rapid industrial development also 
encouraged capital inflow, which comprised seven percent of GDP in 2007, while stock 
market capitalization comprised 44 percent of GDP in 2005. The new regime’s 
industrial impetus seemed to work as GDP averaged an annual growth rate of 6.9 
percent, and so between 1998 and 2006, the country’s GDP increased by 57.6 percent 
(Semenova, 2007).  
Crucial for the success of the new industrial strategy were measures designed to 
curtail extreme asset-stripping activity of existing oligarchs, many of whom had been 
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in situ managers of the former state enterprises. The regime also sought to reduce any 
extortionist activity by regional bureaucrats, who had siphoned off resources from firms 
under the former regime (Hashim, 2005). The opportunist rent-seeking behaviour on 
the part of oligarchs and local bureaucrats is often attributed to the lack of an effective 
investor-protecting legal system, but the pandemic of rent-seeking behaviour ensued 
only after the introduction of Yeltsin’s decentralization under his free-market 
liberalization policy. From the beginning, the new Putin regime’s industrial policy 
returned to a form of centralized control and became increasingly authoritarian, an 
important part of which was to discipline industrial oligarchs under a system of 
patronage.  
Some authors, such as Puffer and McCarthy (2003) point out that at this time 
several corporate governance legal reforms were introduced, such as laws designed to 
protect minority shareholders. But due to the nation’s shift toward more authoritarian 
forms of government, the effectiveness of such laws is questionable. We instead argue 
that of greater significance was the state’s introduction of new forms of incorporation, 
in which the state held significant ownership shares (Vanteeva and Hickson, 2015).  
Vanteeva and Hickson (2016) argue that state representation on the corporate 
governing boards not only prevented asset-stripping by investor managers which was 
so prevalent during the preceding Yeltsin regime, but also encouraged co-partnership 
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firms to invest in longer-term projects rather than to seek to maximize shorter-term 
profits. Part of this new industrializing policy also entailed that the state continued to 
channel subsidized investment funds from state-controlled banks to finance major 
investment projects. Consequently, the state policy emphasized longer-term investment 
projects, part of which would lead it to discourage dividend payouts in favor of capital 
appreciation.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines key 
financial theories that explain firm dividend payout policies around the world. Section 
3 offers data description, and Section 4 presents our findings. Lastly, Section 5 
concludes.   
 
2. The traditional determinants of dividend policy 
General acceptance of the Miller-Modigliani dividend irrelevance proposition impelled 
subsequent work to seek explanations in the idiosyncrasies of tax systems, and in 
transaction costs associated with asymmetric financial markets. Tax-based theories are 
centered on the proposition that firms develop strategies to minimize shareholder tax 
liabilities. Asymmetric market arguments, on the other hand, are based on the 
proposition that higher performing firms increase dividend payouts to signal outside 
investors in order to increase their stock price (Copeland and Weston, 1988).  
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First, we consider papers concentrating on the various strategies adopted by firms 
to maximize shareholder after-tax returns, particularly by exploiting differentials 
between capital gains tax rates and income tax rates, payable on dividend income. For 
example, Chetty and Saez (2005) find that a significant number of US corporations 
increased their dividend yields after income tax rates were reduced. Similarly, 
Pattenden and Twite (2008) find that Australian firms increased their dividend yields 
after measures were adopted that reduced the tax rate levied on dividend income. 
Finally, Allen et al. (2000) find a clientele effect in favor of US institutional investors, 
who are taxed less than individual investors, with the former preferring to hold 
dividend-paying stock more than individuals.  
Regarding studies focusing on dividends acting as signals of improved future 
corporate earnings, we first note that the seminal work of Lintner (1956) found a 
positive relationship between company earnings and dividend payout ratios. The author 
attributed this relationship to managers’ estimates of changes in earnings. Fama and 
Babiak (1968), in a later work based on a large sample of US corporations between 
1947 and 1964, find robust supporting evidence for Lintner’s hypothesis. Brown et al. 
(1977) also find a positive link between profits and changes in dividend payouts on a 
sample of Australian firms during the period spanning the 1960s and 1970s. One can 
find much supporting work on the positive relationship between higher dividend payout 
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ratios and higher company profits. For example, see Bhattacharya (1979), John and 
Williams (1985), Miller and Rock (1985), Healy and Palepu (1988), Garrett and 
Priestley (2000), Capstaff et al. (2004).  
One type of responses to Modigliani-Miller’s capital structure irrelevance 
proposition was to explain capital structure based on the ability of firms to write off 
the interest cost of debt against corporate tax obligations. While firms in this way may 
be able to expand their investment portfolio at less cost, they also can pass through 
gains from the above tax-saving to shareholders in the form of increased dividend 
payouts. They can alternatively reward shareholders in the form of capital gains 
generated by stock buybacks. For example, Adedeji (1998) established a positive 
relationship between leverage and dividend payout rates when analyzing a sample of 
224 firms in the UK between 1993 and 1996.  
An alternative approach pioneered by Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) 
is based on the proposition that firms act in the interests of existing shareholders, which 
impels them to follow a pecking order for raising capital. Firms operating in asymmetric 
markets and desiring to exploit all profitable investments, would first opt to raise funds 
through retained earnings, as this strategy would not affect a firm’s stock price. Their 
second preference would be to issue debt as debt is less correlated with future state-
dependent investment returns, and only as a last resort would a firm issue new equity 
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as this option would depreciate their stock prices.  
Fama and French (2001) consider costs associated with both tax and risk factors 
associated with paying dividends. They find that for US firms during the 1960s, high-
growth firms tended to pay lower dividends. The authors also find that the proportion 
of US firms paying dividends fell from 65 percent in 1978 to 21 percent in 1999, which 
they attribute to a major influx of small, high-value firms that typically had strong 
investment opportunities. Consequently, they tended to enjoy high growth rates. 
Interestingly, Gul (1999) finds a similar negative correlation between high growth and 
decline in dividend payout ratios for Japanese firms between 1988 and 1992. 
However, the pecking order hypothesis may be less relevant when applied to 
Russian firms due to the presence of state representatives on governing boards. In 
addition, Russian firms would have less of an incentive to attract outside investors 
because they tend to have highly concentrated ownership structures (Vanteeva and 
Hickson, 2016). Therefore, Russian firms in our period would have incurred lower 
transaction costs stemming from asymmetric financial market problems and 
consequently would have had less need to use dividends to signal to outside investors. 
The Russian tax system had some characteristics which would have worked to 
encourage corporate dividend payouts, while other features would have worked to 
discourage payouts. Among the former factors were the fact that Russian corporations, 
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during our period, were able write-off the interest cost of debt, while paying a corporate 
tax rate of between 20 and 24 percent. In addition, individual tax rates payable on 
dividend income were reduced to 13 percent in 2001 from a much higher rate of 30 
percent. Also, domestic shareholders owning at least 50 percent of a company shares 
enjoyed tax-free dividend income and firms owning shares in other corporations paid 
only 9 percent on any dividend income.    
However, working against the propensity to pay dividends was the fact that 
Russian corporations, in comparison to western firms, carried little debt, and a large 
proportion of corporate debt was borrowed from state sources at very low interest rates 
(Vedev, 2008). Both factors above would have combined to reduce any gains from 
leverage. Finally, we also note that the Russian tax system treated capital gains as 
ordinary income, implying that shareholder-after-tax returns would be the same. 
Consequently, any net effect on dividend payout propensity attributable to taxation 
policy would depend on the relative strengths of all the above factors.  
Evidence indicates that Russian firms were reluctant to pay dividends, and this 
reluctance contrasts with the traditional practice of western firms. But perhaps more 
significantly, the dividend policy of the Russian firms also contrasts with the corporate 
dividend practice observed in other developing financial markets, where traditional 
dividend policy determinants shed some light on the payout pattern. For example, 
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Fumey and Isaack (2013) find a strong positive relationship between financial leverage 
and dividend payout ratios for listed firms in Ghana. Many other studies on developing 
markets also find dividend payout ratios to be highly correlated with company earnings 
and growth (Adaoglu, 2000; Travlos et al., 2001; Aivazian et al., 2003; Naceur et al. 
2006; Al-Malkawi, 2008). For instance, Mitton (2004) shows that growth and dividend 
payout ratios are negatively correlated across emerging economies. In addition, on a 
sample of 150 Indian firms from 2001 through 2010, Lahiri (2013) identifies a positive 
effect for foreign-institutional investor presence on dividend payouts. These results are 
consistent with those of Khan (2006), who finds that institutional ownership has a large 
positive effect on the dividend payout ratio of 330 large UK firms. Indeed, the general 
consensus is that corporations located in developing financial markets have similar 
dividend payout patterns to those of western firms.  
In terms of ownership, it might be more relevant to compare Russian firms with 
firms in developing financial markets which also have a preponderance of state 
ownership. For example, as is widely recognized, Chinese legal institutions outwardly 
appear like those of western economies, but ultimate, and often arbitrary, commercial 
decisions are made by the Communist Party leadership (Pargendler et al., 2013). 
Milhaupt and Zheng (2015) show that privatized state-owned enterprises in China are 
essentially mixed (state-private) ownership firms, which are, as in Russia, similarly 
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favored through subsidized state loans (Feyzioglu et al., 2013). The interest on the state 
loans are also tax deductible. In addition, China, as in Russia, treats capital gains as 
ordinary income, taxable at the ordinary income-tax rate.  
Lin et al. (2010) and Wang et al. (2011) find a positive relationship between 
dividends and state ownership in China, especially for firms with poor investment 
opportunities. Significantly, however, overall the Chinese government collected little 
to no dividend income from the state-owned enterprises, and almost all of dividend 
income accruing to the state was returned to the sector as subsidies (Milhaupt and 
Zheng, 2015). Finally, though Chinese state-run enterprises increased dividend yields 
in the late 2000s, they remained considerably below the corporate dividend yields of 
similar state-owned enterprises in other developing economies (Zhang, 2009; Huang et 
al., 2011).  
Regarding the rent-seeking prevalence in Russia during our sample period and 
dividend payout incidence, Wright et al. (2003), point out that the 1996 shareholder- 
protection law, which covered dividend payment obligations, was rarely enforced. It 
should also be noted that our sample period includes the corporate policy of the 
incipient Putin regime, which was to increase state ownership in almost all major 
enterprises in the country. This ownership transformation process entailed extensive in 
situ shareholder expropriation, not only for the purpose of increased direct state 
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ownership, but also to favor a newly emerging political clique. But did this ownership 
change lead to increased rent-seeking behavior of insider-investors and local state 
officials? Fry and Iwasaki (2011) in their study of Russian corporate governance of the 
early 2000s, find no strong evidence of increased rent-seeking. Their study focused on 
the role of government-backed directors on corporate boards, rather than simply on the 
percentage of state ownership. Moreover, Liljeblom and Maury (2016) find that 
between 1998 to 2003 state-controlled firms paid more frequent dividends than private 
firms. Similarly, Ankudinov and Lebedev (2016) find that, though state firms tended to 
pay fewer dividends during the financial crisis than private firms, public firms in the 
preceding period typically payed more frequent dividends. More interestingly, the 
authors argue that their results are consistent with the view that the interests of the state 
as a stakeholder took precedence over its interests as a shareholder.  
The above findings are consistent with an alternative view that state co-ownership 
of corporations, which required the placing of state representatives on corporate boards, 
increased state monitoring of inside-investors, securing longer-term investment 
projects. That is, state policy was to discourage increasing dividends payouts in favor 
of increasing overall corporate contributions into the state’s social welfare fund. The 
latter being a primary source of government investment assistance to firms. The above 
view is consistent with the work of Vanteeva and Hickson (2016), which finds that 
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during the early 2000s, state co-ownership mostly prevailed in firms characterized by 
large lump-sum investment outlays with high asset specificity and long-term 
investment horizons, such as existing in energy and utility enterprises. The above 
authors find that co-ownership had a positive effect on firms’ long-run performance. 
The authors argue that this was due to closer state monitoring of insider-investors, 
which lowered hold-up costs. Indeed, increased dividend payouts would also be 
counter-productive to the state’s policy of providing extensive subsidized investment 
loans to favored firms.  
 
3. Data description 
3.1. Data sources 
Our goal in this section is to test whether the usual factors, namely firm size, 
profitability, growth prospects, debt levels and dividend tax effects had any impact on 
corporate dividend policy in Russia during the 1998-2006 period. Our dataset is based 
on all the companies listed on the Russian Trading System stock exchange and main 
data sources are the SKRIN and RTS databases. The former was established by 
shareholders from the National Association of Securities Markets participants, and it 
offers company quarterly and annual reports from 1998 onwards. We are particularly 
interested in financial information, such as market capitalization, earnings, asset value, 
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and levels of debt, as well firm-specific characteristics, such as ownership. We also use 
company websites to fill in missing observations. In the beginning of our sample period, 
there were 150 companies trading on RTS. This number grew to 329 by the end of 2006, 
but our dataset is reduced to 253 companies due to missing information, as it turns out, 
stemming mostly from the banking sector. However, our final dataset ends up 
containing 1,075 firm-year observations.  
 
3.2. Description of variables 
Previous research suggests that Russian companies may have unstable dividend policies. 
Consequently, we follow the approach of Fama and French (2001) by using a dummy 
variable for our dependent variable, indicating whether a firm actually paid a dividend. 
This variable takes a value of 1 if a dividend is paid during a year, and 0 otherwise.  
Regarding our explanatory variables, we use net profit before interest and tax 
divided by sales to capture company profitability (Machin and Van Reenen, 1993; 
Loughran and Ritter, 1997). However, as Fama and French (2001) find that profitable, 
dividend-paying companies also tend to have high asset values, we use the natural log 
of total assets variable to capture firm size (Faccio et al., 2001).   
 To account for the effect that high-growth-opportunity firms may devote more 
resources to investments, we introduce a Tobin’s Q proxy, which is a measure of the 
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market value of assets divided by the book value of assets. Again, following Fama and 
French (2001), we define a firm’s growth potential by the sum of its book value of debt 
and the market value of its equity, divided by its total assets (Fama and French, 2005; 
Aggarwal and Samwick, 2006). Next, we account for any effect on dividend policy, 
which can be attributed to the amount of debt in each firm’s capital structure. To do so, 
we opt to follow Rajan and Zingales (1995) by including the variable defined as the 
sum of long and short-term debt, divided by total assets.  
Lastly, we want to test for any effect on dividend policy due to any tax break 
advantage. As we noted above, ownership of Russian firms is highly concentrated, and 
ownership is largely in the hands of other corporations, financial institutions and the 
state.1 More importantly, dividend income is tax free if the receiving firm is at least 50 
percent owned by a domestic shareholder and has a market value of at least 500 million 
roubles2. To capture this effect, we introduce a dividend tax-break dummy variable 
equal to 1 if the firm meets the above criteria, and 0 otherwise.  
We include two additional control variables to capture firm longevity and 
ownership concentration. In general, a company’s propensity to pay dividends might be 
affected by its longevity because ‘older’ firms tend to be characterized as having older 
                                                        
1 Over our entire time period we have identified less than 10 individual shareholders, who own more 
than 5 percent of capital. 
2 The shareholder structure must remain the same for at least one year when dividend was decided.  
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technology and too being large. As such, they are less likely to have enhanced growth 
prospects (Evans, 1987a, 1987b; Variyam and Kraybill, 1992). Correspondingly, such 
firms are more likely to distribute profits to shareholders. However, we also believe that  
in Russia, it is particularly important to also distinguish between large, old Soviet-type 
firms, which still had to be registered as new joint stock companies in the beginning of 
the privatization period in 1992, and companies that were formed once laissez-faire 
reforms were introduced. The reason for this is that old Soviet-type firms were more 
likely to inherit the top-down corporate governance approach, which did not rely on 
any western free-market principles. To capture this effect, we introduce a dummy 
variable having a value of 1 if a firm had existed during the Soviet regime, and 0 
otherwise.  
 Many studies find that higher ownership concentration levels adversely affect the 
likelihood of paying dividends. For example, Mancinelli and Ozkan (2006), in a study 
of 139 Italian companies, find that firms with a large and controlling shareholder tend 
to pay less dividends. On the other hand, Chen et al. (2005), in their study of family- 
owned Hong Kong firms find little effect on dividend policy. To account for such an 
effect, we proxy ownership concentration by the percentage of capital owned by the 
largest shareholder.  
Finally, we want to control for the fact that firm ownership type might influence 
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dividend policy and we are particularly interested in state ownership. The company 
reports we use disclose all shareholders who hold at least five percent of a firm’s capital. 
In our sample, the state typically owns between 50 and 90 percent of corporate capital 
if it is a single major shareholder, and approximately 40 percent of capital if it represents 
one of the major shareholders. Consequently, we define a firm as state-controlled if the 
government is the single major shareholder, or simply one of the major shareholders in 
a firm, in which case we assign a value of 1 (and 0 otherwise).3  The reason for 
introducing a dummy variable is that, due to high-ownership concentration, a major 
shareholder will possess significant decision-making power, augmented with having a 
seat on corporate boards, irrespective of the actual percentage of capital owned. The 
definition of variables is summarized in Table 1. 
                       [insert Table 1 here] 
 
4. Findings 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
We define a firm as a ‘consistent payer’ if it paid a dividend during at least eight out of 
nine years over our sample period spanning 1998-2006. Table 2 below shows that 111 
firms, less than half of firms included in our sample, paid consistent dividends. The 
                                                        
3 Companies, which are owned by the state indirectly, are also placed under state ownership category. 
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table also shows that 88 companies had inconsistent dividend policies (i.e. skipped 
dividends during at least two years over the given time period), and 54 firms never paid 
a dividend.   
 When we examine various characteristics of firms, we see that, as measured by 
the value of total assets, non-paying firms tended to be smaller companies, and 
inconsistent dividend payers tended to be slightly larger than consistent payers. 
However, the table also shows that firms, having more consistent dividend patterns, 
tended to be more profitable, having a profitability ratio of 0.093. In comparison, 
inconsistent payers have a lower profitability index of 0.082, and non-payers have a 
profitability index of 0.043. At this early stage, these findings might offer preliminary 
support for a signaling hypothesis.  
 Growth, (or Tobin’s Q) for non-paying firms is significantly higher than that of 
consistent and inconsistent payers. Thus, our early findings might also lend support for 
the view that high-growth companies tend to reinvest earnings rather than paying 
dividends, but, consistent payers still exhibit a slightly higher Tobin’s value than 
inconsistent payers. Our preliminary statistics also indicate that Russian firms do not 
follow a pecking-order hypothesis. For example, consistent dividend payers have the 
lowest debt ratio of 0.066, and non-payers have a ratio of 0.182, while inconsistent 
payers have a ratio of 0.227. Finally, the table shows that ownership concentration for 
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all companies was high, though major shareholders of non-payers own the highest 
percentage of capital, with a mean of just over 49 percent.  
                             [insert Table 2 here] 
 
4.2. Regression results 
Similar to Fama and French (2001), we employ a binary logit model (L), but on an 
unbalanced panel data set in order to estimate the probability of a firm paying a dividend 
based on our predictor variables (the logit function being the natural log of odds that 
our endogenous variable equals one of the two outcomes). Logistic regression is widely 
used in analyzing categorical-response variables, as the regression does not assume the 
presence of a normal distribution for independent variables. Logistic equation 1 
identifies the relationship between the outcome variable Y (where p is the probability 
of Y being equal to 1, or whether a dividend has been paid), and a set of predictor 
variables (X) by estimating the parameter values for β. 
 
Logit(p) = log(p/(1-p)) = β0 + β1Sizeit + β2 Profitabilityit + β3Growthit + β4Debtit + 
β5Tax breakit + β6Longevityit + β7Ownership concentrationit + vit              (1) 
 
After carrying out the Hausman specification test, we could not reject the null 
22 
 
hypothesis that the unobserved individual firm level effects are uncorrelated with other 
covariates and hence we employ a random effects estimator. 4  In addition, as a 
robustness check, we also introduce a probit model (P), where the dependent variable 
takes on the value of 1 or 0, but error terms are independent and normally distributed 
(column 2), as well as a linear probability model (LPM), which allows the model to be 
estimated by a simple linear regression (in this case, Generalized Least Squares, column 
3).  
It can be seen from Table 3 that none of the traditional corporate dividend policy 
determinants can explain dividend payout behavior of RTS-listed firms over the given 
period. Though size and profitability variables exhibit positive coefficients, both 
coefficients are statistically insignificant. We also find that the growth variable has a 
positive coefficient, but it is also insignificant. Thus, our results do not support the view 
that high-growth firms are more likely to retain profits to fund further investment. Nor 
do they support the view that high-growth firms located in low property-right protection 
environments are more likely to pay dividends (La Porta et al., 2000). Neither do our 
results support a pecking order hypothesis, as the coefficient for the debt variable is 
both negative and insignificant. But the finding is consistent with the view that the state 
discourages dividend payouts when firms enjoy the use of subsidized loans.   
                                                        
4 The test fails to generate a significant p-value (chi squared value is reported to be 5.67, while p-value 
is 0.58) to show that there is a systematic difference in coefficients.  
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Unsurprisingly, the table shows tentative support for the view that firms, which 
are subject to a more favorable tax rate, tend to have a more consistent dividend policy. 
The coefficient has a value of 0.660 in column 1 and 0.377 in column 2 (both significant 
at 10 percent level). Once we compute marginal effects, we find that being subject to a 
favorable tax code increases the probability of paying dividends by approximately 7 
percent (0.066 and 0.071 for columns 1 and 2, respectively).  
Lastly, we can see that the coefficient of our control variable for ownership 
concentration is both of small magnitude and insignificant in all regressions. Thus, 
neither do large and controlling shareholders tend to reward themselves through 
dividends.  
However, we do find that firm longevity positively affects the propensity of firm 
dividend payouts. The variable’s coefficient value is reported to be 2.225 in column 1, 
and 1.264 in column 2, being statistically significant at 1 percent level on both 
occasions, meaning that once we compute marginal effects again, the probability of 
‘older’ firms paying dividends increases by 0.221 and 0.240, respectively. In column 3, 
the longevity coefficient decreases to 0.242, and while it is still significant at 1 percent 
level, we also note a low R squared. This is consistent with the fact that while the 
probability on the left hand-side of the equation lies between 0 and 1, the linear 
predictors on the right hand-side of the equation can generally be of any value, hence it 
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is possible that the predicted values will not be in the correct range and produce a 
weaker model. Nevertheless, our overall results suggest that ‘old’ companies, that is, 
those that had existed prior to the privatization initiative, paid dividends.  
                        [insert Table 3 here] 
 We are also interested in whether corporate ownership type affects dividend policy. 
From Table 4 we can see that the state variable’s coefficient is large (with values of 
1.186, 0.619 and 0.081) and significant. Once again, once we compute marginal effects, 
we can see that state (or partial state) ownership increases the probability of dividend 
payout by 12 percent (for logit and probit model) and 8 percent for linear probability 
model. This is in line with the findings of Wang et al. (2011) for China, where the 
authors found a positive relationship between dividend payouts and state ownership. 
The authors attribute their findings to the state’s need for cash flows as a motivation for 
its involvement in firm corporate structure. In addition, we note that the inclusion of 
the state variable does not change our previous findings in that tax break and longevity 
have almost an identical effect on dividend payout propensity.               
                           [insert Table 4 here] 
Our results on Russian corporations for our sample period fail to find supporting 
evidence that firm size, profitability, growth and debt ratios influenced dividend policy. 
However, firms which were subject to a favorable tax regime and firms that were state-
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owned or partially state-owned, and pre-existed during Soviet times, did tend to pay out 
dividends. Next, we test whether firms differ in their dividend policy according to 
industry. Table 5 identifies eight major industry sectors for RTS-listed firms during the 
1998-2006 period – energy, utility, transport, metallurgy and mining, manufacturing, 
communications, banking and services, and food and retail. The table shows that 73 
percent of communication firms paid consistent dividends. Next from the table, we see 
that 69 percent of utility firms paid consistent dividends and 62 percent of energy firms 
and just over half of transport companies paid such dividends. In comparison, 
metallurgy and mining industry firms were the most inconsistent in paying dividends, 
while a large proportion of firms in the banking and services, as well as food and retail 
industries paid no dividends.    
                        [insert Table 5 here] 
 When we incorporate industry dummy variables in our regression analysis (Table 
6), we can see that only utility industry has a large, positive effect on dividend policy.  
Its coefficient has a value of 1.654 in column 1, 0.933 in column 2 (which corresponds 
to utility firms being associated with increased probability of dividend payout of 18 
percent) and 0.180 in column 3, all coefficients being statistically significant at 10 
percent level. All other industry variables, except for energy firms, have predicted, 
though insignificant coefficients. Consistently, firm longevity and state ownership have 
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a large and positive impact on dividend payouts, while the tax-break variable is now 
insignificant in columns 1 and 2. 
                           [insert Table 6 here] 
We carry out further robustness checks in Table 7. First, as the longevity variable 
appears to have the strongest impact on dividend payout policy, we replace the dummy 
variable with the actual number of years the firm has been registered for. The results in 
the first three columns (logit, probit and linear probability model regressions) indicate 
that the variable is still significant, but smaller in magnitude (once marginal effects are 
computed, we note that as age increases, the probability of dividend payouts rises by 
1.3 and 1.4 percent).5  
We attribute the difference in the longevity effect between age dummy variable 
and the number of years that the firm was registered for to the fact that the latter may 
not correctly identify whether the company had already existed during the Soviet times 
and hence inherited centrally-planned governing mechanisms. This is due to all 
companies (whether being old Soviet firms or entirely new enterprises) having to 
register as joint stock entities in the beginning of the privatization period in 1992. The 
age dummy variable, on the other hand, specifically targets firms’ Soviet origin, which 
                                                        
5 We also included the state and industry variables in separate regressions and found that probabilities 
of dividend payout increased by 1.2 and 1.7 percent with firm age, which is consistent with previous 
findings. 
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may better explain its corporate governance code.6  
We then introduce several interaction terms for key variables of interest, namely 
longevity and tax break, longevity and utility, longevity and state, as well as state and 
tax break and state and utility. We conclude that interaction terms do not offer any 
additional explanatory power as to why firms pay dividends, as all interaction terms are 
insignificant. Furthermore, we note in columns 4 and 5 and 6 that once we interact 
longevity and tax break, state and tax break and state and utility variables, the 
interaction terms display negative coefficients. This potentially signals that longevity, 
tax break and state variables capture similar firm characteristics and are associated with 
utility-sector firms. 
                        [insert Table 7 here] 
Indeed, once we repeated the regression analysis when utility sector firms were 
dropped from our sample, the only variable remaining significant was firm longevity, 
yet we noted that the Wald-chi squared statistic is extremely low, hence our independent 
variables carried no explanatory power. Thus, it can be argued that in Russia, over our 
time period between 1998 and 2006, the idiosyncratic pattern of corporate dividend 
policy was attributed to just utility sector firms paying stable dividends. 
                                                        
6 As an additional robustness check, we also introduced a time lag for our predictor variables in order to 
determine whether an unexpected change in explanatory variables in the previous periods affected current 
dividend policy. However, our results demonstrated that lagged explanatory variables are insignificant.  
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5. Discussion and concluding remarks 
Our findings show that the dividend payouts of most firms trading on the Russian 
Trading System stock exchange between 1998 and 2006 were inconsistent. We believe 
that this can be explained by the structure of the Russian tax system and by the fact that 
the Russian corporation, which evolved at the start of our sample period, was heavily 
monitored by the state, which in many cases was a part owner, but also furnished  
favored firms with heavily subsidized investment loans.  
Utility companies were the exceptions in paying consistent dividends. In our 
sample, this sector is primarily comprised of electricity firms. For example, there were 
54 electricity firms trading on RTS in 1998, and this number grew to 106 by the end of 
2006. These electricity firms are subsidiaries of the Unified Energy Systems of Russia 
(ROA UES), which is an ‘old’ firm according to our definition. It is also a firm in which 
the state was a major shareholder. Though in 1992 RAO UES, the vertically integrated 
monopoly, was unbundled and partially privatized, the state maintained its ownership 
of nuclear and hydropower plants, system operator and network companies and also 
maintained a stake in many territorial and wholesale generation firms.  
There are 420 observations in this industry and we believe that our results are 
driven by the utility sector. We attribute the propensity of utility firms to pay consistent 
dividends to the fact that the utility industry in Russia is heavily regulated and does not 
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present a lucrative investment opportunity. The Federal Tariff Service, which replaced 
the Federal Energy Commission in 2004, regulated all tariffs of natural monopolies. 
The wholesale market, which was established in 2006, allowed for a small share (5 
percent) of electricity to be sold at non-regulated prices. However, these prices were 
still low when compared to Europe. For example, households consistently enjoyed 
capped prices, with no alternative pricing plans being proposed today.7 Consequently, 
investments in electricity sector are believed to be so unprofitable, firms are unable to 
recover initial capital costs (Kristiansen, 2011). Engoian (2006) believes that electricity 
sector investments would be unable to generate sufficient returns for the first 10-15 
years. With potential growth from future investments in the industry curtailed by 
regulation, dividend payouts from the electric utility monopolies to attract investors 
may be their best option.  
Our paper raises several issues for future study. First, by updating our sample, 
we may be able to ascertain whether the propensity of firms to pay dividends is affected 
by adverse external shocks, such as the 2007-2008 financial crisis. Second, whether 
identifying and capturing other, non-traditional and ‘non-market’ determinants of 
dividend policy (for instance, regulation, corruption and state involvement) may better 
explain dividend payout patterns of corporations in countries with non-western political 
                                                        
7 No other industry in our sample is subject to similar regulations. 
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regimes.  
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Table 1. Definition of variables* 
Variable 
 
Description 
Dividend  
 
Equals 1 if the firm paid a dividend during the year; 0 otherwise 
(Fama and French, 2001). 
 
Profitability 
 
Et / Salest. The ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to sales 
(Machin and Van Reenen, 1993; Loughran and Ritter, 1997). 
 
Size  LnAt. The natural log of total assets (Faccio et al., 2001). 
 
Growth  
 
Tobin’s Q = (Vt + LTDt + STDt) / At.  The market value of equity 
plus book value of debt, divided by total assets (Fama and French, 
2005; Aggarwal and Samwick, 2006). 
 
Debt (LTDt + STDt)/ At. The ratio of book value of long-term and short-
term debt to total assets (Rajan and Zinglaes, 1995). 
 
Tax break 
 
Equals 1 if company shareholders are exempt from dividend tax 
by satisfying 50% Russian investor criteria; 0 otherwise. 
  
Longevity 
 
Equals 1 if the firm had existed during the Soviet era; 0 otherwise. 
 
Ownership 
concentration 
 
Fraction of capital owned by the largest shareholder, expressed in 
%. 
State  
 
Equals 1 if the firm has the state as its major shareholder, or one 
of its major shareholders; 0 otherwise. 
 
 
   *All financial data is expressed in thousands of Russian rubles. 
 
 
 
 
 Table 2. Descriptive statistics of firms trading on RTS between 1998 and 2006 
 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std 
Dev 
Min Max 
   Consistent payers (111 firms)    
Size 940 15.738 1.705 9.083 20.910 
Profitability 788 0.093 0.268 -1.944 5.575 
Growth 758 0.791 0.915 0.001 7.593 
Debt  842 0.066 0.104 0.000 0.648 
Ownership 
concentration 
911 46.963 16.828 6.000 99.000 
  Inconsistent payers (88 firms)    
Size 617 15.788 1.861 9.664 22.215 
Profitability 525 0.082 0.134 -0.197 1.902 
Growth 434 0.780 0.945 0.003 6.747 
Debt 547 0.227 1.661 0.000 0.984 
Ownership 
concentration 
614 47.210 20.914 8.000 99.000 
  Non-payers (54 firms)    
Size 213 15.162 1.954 9.708 21.874 
Profitability 168 0.043 0.182 -1.637 0.674 
Growth 127 1.383 1.971 0.050 17.931 
Debt 192 0.182 0.194 0.000 0.832 
Ownership 
concentration 
187 49.106 22.982 9.220 99.000 
 
Table 3.  The effect of traditional dividend determinants on payout policy of RTS-listed firms 
during 1998-2006 
 
 Variable 
 
Dividend (L) 
 
Dividend (P) 
 
Dividend (LPM) 
  Size 
 
0.138 
(0.130) 
 
0.069 
(0.074) 
0.017 
(0.015) 
  Profitability 0.041 
(0.058) 
 
0.024 
(0.034) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
  Growth 0.178 
(0.169) 
 
0.102 
(0.096) 
0.007 
(0.017) 
  Debt -1.746 
(1.235) 
 
-0.949 
(0.713) 
-0.167 
(0.148) 
  Tax break 0.660* 
(0.345) 
 
0.377* 
(0.196) 
0.065 
(0.040) 
  Longevity 2.225*** 
(0.610) 
 
1.264*** 
(0.348) 
0.242*** 
(0.065) 
  Ownership     
  concentration 
0.004 
(0.009) 
 
0.002 
(0.005) 
0.0002 
(0.001) 
  
 Time effect 
 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Constant -2.584 
(2.081) 
 
-1.314 
(1.187) 
0.232 
(0.236) 
 Obs 1075 
 
1075 1075 
 Log likelihood/ 
 R squared 
-450.52 -451.15 0.045 
 Wald-chi squared 23.77*** 23.65*** 30.85*** 
 
Table 4.  The effect of state ownership on dividend payout policy of RTS-listed firms during  
1998-2006 
 
Variable 
 
Dividend (L) Dividend (P) Dividend (LPM) 
 
Size 
 
0.137 
(0.130) 
 
0.069 
(0.074) 
0.017 
(0.013) 
Profitability 
 
0.033 
(0.054) 
 
0.020 
(0.032) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
Growth 
 
0.168 
(0.170) 
 
0.094 
(0.096) 
0.014 
(0.014) 
Debt -1.701 
(1.239) 
 
-0.921 
(0.715) 
-0.156 
(0.112) 
Tax break 
 
0.704** 
(0.347) 
 
0.399** 
(0.197) 
0.067** 
(0.032) 
Longevity 
 
2.124*** 
(0.611) 
 
1.206*** 
(0.348) 
0.226*** 
(0.060) 
Ownership 
concentration 
0.001 
(0.009) 
 
0.001 
(0.005) 
0.0002 
(0.001) 
State 1.186* 
(0.636) 
 
0.619* 
(0.345) 
0.081* 
(0.049) 
Time effect 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -2.448 
(2.082) 
 
-1.254 
(1.186) 
0.215 
(0.205) 
Obs 1075 
 
1075 1075 
Log likelihood/R 
squared 
-448.40 -449.18 0.05 
Wald-chi squared 26.67*** 26.68*** 31.14*** 
 
     Table 5. Dividend payout pattern of RTS-listed firms across industry during 1998-2006 
Industry 
 
Consistent payers (%) Inconsistent payers (%) Non-payers (%) 
Energy 
 
62 26 12 
Utility 
 
69 23 8 
Transport 
 
57 28 15 
Metallurgy and 
Mining 
 
25 71 4 
Manufacturing 
 
47 44 9 
Communications 
 
73 27 0 
Banking and 
Services 
 
26 44 30 
Food and Retail 
 
35 35 30 
 
Table 6. The effect of industry type on dividend payout pattern of RTS-listed firms during 
1998-2006 
 
Variable 
 
Dividend (L) Dividend (P) Dividend (LPM) 
Size 
 
0.223 
(0.134) 
0.118 
(0.076) 
0.024* 
(0.013) 
Profitability 
 
0.045 
(0.055) 
0.026 
(0.032) 
0.003 
(0.004) 
Growth 
 
0.243 
(0.172) 
0.137 
(0.097) 
0.019 
(0.015) 
Debt -1.134 
(1.257) 
-0.581 
(0.723) 
-0.115 
(0.113) 
Tax break 0.575 
(0.350) 
0.324 
(0.198) 
0.056* 
(0.033) 
Longevity 
 
2.343*** 
(0.636) 
1.331*** 
(0.361) 
0.241*** 
(0.064) 
Ownership concentration 
 
-0.002 
(0.009) 
-0.001 
(0.005) 
-0.0001 
(0.001) 
State  
 
1.319** 
(0.628) 
0.694** 
(0.340) 
0.091* 
(0.049) 
Energy -0.714 
(1.200) 
-0.404 
(0.682) 
-0.041 
(0.126) 
Utility 1.654* 
(0.955) 
0.933* 
(0.541) 
0.180* 
(0.097) 
Manufacturing -0.045 
(1.039) 
-0.029 
(0.590) 
0.019 
(0.103) 
Transport 1.440 
(1.593) 
0.802 
(0.905) 
0.150 
(0.165) 
Metal and mining -0.977 
(1.166) 
-0.552 
(0.661) 
-0.065 
(0.118) 
Communications  1.628 
(1.245) 
0.925 
(0.708) 
0.161 
(0.128) 
Food and retail -0.458 
(1.307) 
-0.277 
(0.743) 
-0.023 
(0.138) 
Time effect 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -4.539* 
(2.313) 
-2.436* 
(1.314) 
0.014 
(0.232) 
Obs 1075 1075 1075 
Log likelihood/R squared -439.62 -440.35 0.10 
Wald-chi squared 40.90*** 41.42*** 46.27*** 
 
 
Table 7.  The effect of dividend determinants on payout policy of RTS-listed firms during 
1998-2006 (robustness checks) 
 Variable 
 
Dividend L 
longevity=yr 
Dividend  P 
longevity=yr 
Dividend LPM 
longevity=yr 
Dividend L  
 
Dividend L Dividend L 
 Size 
 
0.152 
(0.131) 
0.078 
(0.075) 
0.017 
(0.013) 
 
0.137 
(0.130) 
0.140 
(0.131) 
0.196 
(0.127) 
 Profitability 0.043 
(0.061) 
0.025 
(0.036) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
 
0.041 
(0.059) 
0.032 
(0.054) 
0.042 
(0.054) 
 Growth 0.075 
(0.163) 
0.043 
(0.093) 
0.008 
(0.014) 
 
0.178 
(0.169) 
0.169 
(0.170) 
0.215 
(0.169) 
 Debt -1.725 
(1.224) 
-0.943 
(0.707) 
-0.168 
(0.112) 
 
-1.748 
(1.235) 
-1.729 
(1.241) 
-0.924 
(1.266) 
 Tax break 0.669* 
(0.346) 
0.382* 
(0.197) 
0.064** 
(0.032) 
 
0.793 
(0.830) 
0.725** 
(0.350) 
0.609* 
(0.347) 
 Longevity 0.122** 
(0.053) 
0.070** 
(0.030) 
0.013** 
(0.005) 
 
2.289*** 
(0.713) 
2.125*** 
(0.613) 
2.294*** 
(0.596) 
Ownership     
concentration 
0.005 
(0.009) 
0.002 
(0.005) 
0.0004 
(0.0009) 
 
0.004 
(0.009) 
0.001 
(0.009) 
-0.002 
(0.009) 
Longevity*Tax 
break 
 
   -0.152 
(0.861) 
  
State 
 
    1.379* 
(0.720) 
1.350** 
(0.655) 
 
State*Tax break 
 
    -0.773 
(1.306) 
 
 
Utility  
 
     1.722*** 
(0.522) 
 
Utility*State 
 
     -0.909 
(2.152) 
 
Time effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -2.421 
(2.103) 
-1.231 
(1.203) 
0.237 
(0.207) 
-2.616 
(2.092) 
-2.490 
(2.089) 
-4.096 
(2.084) 
 Obs 1075 1075 1075 1075 1075 1075 
 Log likelihood/R 
squared 
-454.67 -455.29 0.03 -450.50 -448.23 -443.04 
Wald-chi squared 16.17* 16.16* 18.60** 23.75** 27.03*** 35.76*** 
 
